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NOTES
DERAILING THE GRAVY TRAIN: A THREE-PRONGED
APPROACH TO END FRAUD IN MASS TORT MEDICAL
DIAGNOSING
INTRODUCTION
Mass medical screening, or "diagnosing for dollars,"' currently
fuels mass tort litigation. Functionally, these screenings range
from the processing of hundreds to thousands of plaintiffs through
hotel conference rooms acting as quasi-medical offices to unlicensed
technicians operating X-ray machines in the back of a van.3
Although this phenomenon has existed since the early days of
asbestos litigation,4 some mass tort plaintiffs' attorneys appear to
be employing increasingly brazen and dubious methods to enlist
plaintiffs via these medical screenings.5
The extent of this problem was vehemently emphasized by Judge
Jack in her recent opinion in Silica Products.6 In a lengthy and well-
researched opinion, Judge Jack implied that the plaintiffs' attorneys
1. Roger Parloff, Diagnosing for Dollars, FORTUNE, June 13, 2005, at 96-97.
2. See id. at 108.
3. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 598 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Raymark
Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *5 (D. Kan. May 30, 1990).
4. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 308-10
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Raymark, 1990 WL 72588, at *5.
5. See Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 596-603; see also infra Part I.
6. Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 635-37 ("This explosion in the number of silicosis
claims ... suggest[s] perhaps the worst industrial disaster in recorded world history. And yet,
these claims do not look anything like what one would expect from an industrial disaster....
[This appears to be a phantom epidemic ... and the courts ... must determine whether they
are being faced with the effects of an industrial disaster of unprecedented proportion--or
something else entirely.").
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and the diagnosing doctors engaged in rampant fraud, and she
openly questioned the validity of virtually all silica-based personal
injury claims.7 Excoriating the attorneys and doctors involved,
Judge Jack imposed sanctions8 and declared that "these diagnoses
were driven by neither health nor justice: they were manufactured
for money."9
Though her opinion did not definitively establish the amount of
the sanctions to be levied against the plaintiffs' attorneys, Judge
Jack left no doubt that whatever sanction that would ultimately be
levied would be insufficient.'0 The defendants' estimated costs of
preparing for the Daubert hearing" were $825,000,12 but after
finding that her court had subject-matter jurisdiction over only
one percent of the cases, Judge Jack tentatively set the sanctions
at a proportional amount: $8250."3 Even had the sanctions not
been reduced, however, it is not clear that sanctions, alone, could
sufficiently redress the harm the attorneys caused or deter similar
screenings. The problem-that sanctions alone are insufficient to
redress the harms caused by fraudulent medical screening and the
mass tort litigations they drive-is the one this Note aims to solve.
The consequences of these unregulated mass screenings extend
well beyond the obvious drain on corporate pocket books and
clogging of the courts with potentially meritless claims. 4 As at least
one commentator has previously observed, however, "[ildentifying
the problem does not ... prescribe a solution."" This Note proposes
a three-pronged approach to eliminate potential fraud in mass tort
medical screenings.
The first prong is legislative: though several states have passed
commendable tort-reform laws to deal specifically with the asbestos
7. See id. at 571-73.
8. Id. at 680.
9. Id. at 635.
10. See id. at 679.
11. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,593-95 (1993). For a discussion
of Daubert and its progeny, see infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
12. Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
13. Id. at 678-79.
14. See infra Part II.
15. JAMES L. STENGEL, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, MASS TORT SCREENINGS:
THE LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 1 (2005), http'J/www.instituteforlegalreform.com/pdfs/Stengelpdf.
pdf.
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and silica screening crises,16 these efforts do not go far enough.
Rather than litigation-specific, backward-looking legislation, states
should enact broader laws aimed at eliminating the possibility of
future problematic mass screening.
The second prong involves the use of neutral, court-appointed
experts. These experts could fill roles ranging from testifying as
neutral trial experts to devising litigation-specific criteria for the
screening of potential claimants. Though legislation of the type
described above has the advantage of applying to a wide variety
of potential mass torts, its resulting lack of specificity may leave
too much room for interpretation. To close this gap, courts should
use their power under Federal Rule of Evidence 706"7 to appoint
independent medical experts. 8
The final prong is the catch-all: the availability of serious
sanctions against both plaintiffs' attorneys responsible for fraudu-
lent mass screening and also the screening companies themselves.
Although Judge Jack levied fines against the offending attorneys in
Silica Products,9 the amount of the fines was paltry in relation to
the ultimate cost of the meritless claims resulting from the screen-
ing. Courts must be encouraged to levy fines with real deterrent
power to discourage abuses in the screening process.
Part I of this Note will attempt to define the problem of fraudu-
lent mass-medical screening by describing use of such screening in
several types of mass tort litigations. Part II will examine the
consequences of mass-medical screening. Part III will examine the
need for a novel solution and argue that existing methods have not
16. See, e.g., Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 774.201
to .209 (West Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-1 to -10 (Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. COPE
ANN. §§ 2307.84 to .902 (West Supp. 2006) (governing silica or mixed dust disease claims);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.91 to .98 (West Supp. 2006) (governing asbestos claims); TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 90.001 to .012 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
17. FED. R. EvID. 706.
18. A majority of states have adopted provisions identical or similar to Rule 706. See, e.g.,
ALA. R. EvID. 706; CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 1995); MD. RULES 5-706 (LexisNexis 2006).
Although mass tort claims typically arise under state law, the actions relevant to this
Note-those with hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs-may be removable to federal court
under the relaxed removal standards imposed by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (relevant sections codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453
(West 2006)).
19. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 679-80 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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been successful. Finally, Part IV will argue for a three-pronged
approach to eliminating fraudulent medical screening.
I. THE PROBLEM OF SCREENING IN MASS TORT
A. Origins in Asbestos
To appreciate the scope and magnitude of the problem posed by
mass tort medical screenings, it is helpful to examine the beginnings
of the phenomenon. The paradigm example is, of course, asbestos
litigation, which has resulted in hundreds of thousands of cases filed
in the last three decades.2 ° Although tales of asbestos screening
abuses abound,2' one particular example is illustrative of the extent
of the problem. That instance involved an asbestos defendant,
Raymark Industries, bringing fraud and RICO' charges against a
group of asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers, alleging that the lawyers
"devised and controlled a nationwide asbestos claim-generating
scheme which involved the unethical solicitation" of potential
claimants.23 In plain terms, the plaintiffs' lawyers were accused of
fraudulently creating claims.
Specifically, Raymark alleged that the plaintiffs' attorneys
arranged to have vans equipped with X-ray equipment visit tire
manufacturing plants around the country.24 These "examobiles," as
they were called, were operated by medical personnel with dubious
credentials, such as lacking qualifications to diagnose asbestos
disease, having been sued for misrepresenting qualifications, and
being unlicensed to practice medicine in the United States.25
Furthermore, the asbestos disease "diagnoses" were based entirely
20. See S. 15, 79th Leg., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (enacted) (legislative findings
describing the history of asbestos litigation and the need for statutory reform).
21. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
833, 836-39 (2005) (describing the common practices used by asbestos lawyers to screen
potential claimants).
22. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 & Supp. 2004) (containing the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations statute).
23. Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *2 (D. Kan. May
30, 1990).
24. Id. at *5.
25. Id.
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on the X-ray results,26 a practice in direct conflict with the accepted
medical standard of diagnosis, which considers any history of
exposure, an appropriate latency time, chest X-ray evidence, and
several other factors.27 Further reason to doubt the adequacy of
the asbestos litigants' screening protocol is the fact that it resulted
in a diagnosis rate "3 to 4 1/2 times greater than among shipyard
workers[,] who are known to have the greatest risk. 28
In denying the plaintiffs' attorneys' motion for summary judg-
ment, the court in Raymark vehemently summarized its view of the
mass-screening and claim-generation process: "this claim process
appears to be a 'professional farce!' The process makes a mockery of
the practices of law and medicine! Indeed, if this court were now to
acquiesce in any of them it would make a 'laughingstock' of the
court! 29 The court's conclusions about the screenings' accuracy were
ultimately confirmed by science: A 1990 study of tire workers from
one of the sites involved in the Raymark case, which was "prompted
by the reporting of exceedingly high rates of alleged asbestos-related
disease among rubber workers," found rates of disease much lower
than the nearly sixty percent of workers who had filed legal
claims.3 ° "[P]ossibly 16 [3.6%], but more realistically 11 [2.5%], of
the 439 cases evaluated may have a condition consistent with
exposure to an asbestiform mineral."'" The pronounced disparity
between the results of the follow-up study and the diagnoses made
in a mass screening of the same people underscores the gross
unreliability of such screenings.
26. Id.
27. See Am. Thoracic Soc'y, Diagnosis and Initial Management of Nonmalignant Diseases
Related to Asbestos, 170 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 691, 691-92 & tbl. 1
(2004).
28. Raymark, 1990 WL 72588, at *6.
29. Id. at *2.
30. Robert B. Reger et al., Cases of Alleged Asbestos-related Disease: A Radiologic Re-
evaluation, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1088, 1088-89 (1990).
31. Id. at 1089.
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B. Fen-phen32
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that mass tort
screening is just a part of the asbestos mess. The fen-phen litigation
also exploded to unexpected, unmanageable numbers largely due to
the same kind of unethical and possibly fraudulent screening
procedures.33 This time, the product manufacturer decided early in
the litigation to limit claims by arranging a global settlement.34
Rather than eliminating the need for mass screening, however, this
strategy created a "feeding frenzy" which resulted in claims far out
of proportion to expectations.35
Understandably alarmed by the huge number of claims, lawyers
for the settlement trust began auditing individual claims. 3 This
process produced results nothing short of stunning. By 2004, the
trust had audited 4600 claims and found nearly two-thirds of them
deficient.37 The high rate of deficiency, of course, was explained by
the screening process: entire industries had been spawned to screen
potential fen-phen claimants; screening sessions were being held
in law firms and hotel rooms; diagnosing physicians were working
on contingency fees with escalating rewards for more serious
diagnoses; 38 and some diagnosing physicians were finding injuries
at twelve times the rate predicted by their own research studies.39
32. Fen-phen is a nickname for a diet drug cocktail comprising fenfluramine and
phentermine. Fenfluramine and a closely related compound, dexfenfluramine, were
withdrawn from the market after being linked with heart-valve defects. Press Release, Food
& Drug Admin., FDA Announces Withdrawal of Fenfluramine and Dexfenfluramine (Sept.
15, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/phen/fenphenpr81597.htm.
33. See Alison Frankel, Still Ticking, AM. LAW., Mar. 1, 2005, at 92, 97-99, 133.
34. Id. at 94.
35. Id. at 96, 133.
36. Id. at 97-99.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 445, 456-57 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (showing that one doctor found moderate
to severe mitral regurgitation in sixty to seventy percent of the 725 fen-phen claimants she
examined, but that an earlier blinded study of the same diet drugs in which she participated
found moderate to severe mitral regurgitation in only about five percent of like participants);
see also Julius M. Gardin et al., Valvular Abnormalities and Cardiovascular Status Following
Exposure to Dexfenfluramine or Phentermine/Fenfluramine, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1703,
1707, 1709 (2000) (showing the doctor's participation as a principal clinical investigator, and
the study's results).
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Perhaps worst of all, a 2004 audit of claims paid by the settlement
trust found evidence of "rogue frames inserted into the
[echocardiograms] of 84 patients."40 This practice extends well
beyond the realm of exaggerated diagnoses and into that of
completely fabricated ones.
C. Silica
The mass-screening fiasco given the most press recently is the
silica litigation. Judge Jack's blistering opinion reached a conclusion
about silica mass tort screening that might be equally applicable to
all mass tort screenings:
[Tihe clear motivation [for the heavy involvement of the plain-
tiffs' law firm in the screening process] was to inflate the
number of Plaintiffs and claims in order to overwhelm the
Defendants and the judicial system. This is apparently done in
hopes of extracting mass nuisance-value settlements because the
Defendants and the judicial system are financially incapable of
examining the merits of each individual claim in the usual
manner.
41
In support of this conclusion, Judge Jack relied on several sources
of information. First she detailed the screening process itself.
42
Reminiscent of the screenings in Raymark, the silica screening
involved X-ray machines in vans, unqualified technicians, incom-
plete diagnostic protocols, and a small number of doctors responsible
for thousands of diagnoses.4" These factors, intuition suggests, lead
to the possibility of major overdiagnosis and this intuition has been
supported by statistics provided in the opinion. Based on Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) statistics, there ought to
have been between thirty-six and seventy-three cases of silicosis
diagnosed in Mississippi per year;44 but between 2002 and 2004,
40. Frankel, supra note 33, at 133.
41. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
42. See id. at 596-603.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 571 n.8.
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20,479 new silicosis claims were filed in Mississippi courts.45 As
Judge Jack pointed out, "these claims suggest perhaps the worst
industrial disaster in recorded world history," yet 'Mississippi's
apparent silicosis epidemic has been greeted with silence by the
media, the public, Congress and the scientific communities."46 Once
again, the implications of the discrepancy between scientifically
recognized statistics and litigation-driven diagnoses are clear: mass
screenings are unreliable and dramatically inflate the number of
potential claimants in a given law suit.
D. Welding, Others on the Horizon?
Without an effective solution to the problem posed by mass
screening, there is bound to be another asbestos or another silica on
the horizon. In fact, there is some evidence that this problem is
appearing in the relatively nascent welding-rod litigation.47 Based
on the allegation that the manganese in welding fumes may cause
manganism or Parkinson's Disease, the litigation is estimated to
already have between 8000 and 15,000 claimants. 48 Furthermore,
with approximately 800,000 welders in the United States and a
large pool of potential defendants, the litigation has the potential to
grow.
49
Many of these claims are apparently the result of a mass-
screening process run by a Wisconsin neurologist, who claims to
have screened 20,000 people thus far.5' The neurologist received
45. Id. at 572.
46. Id. To show the significance of the lack of public attention on the supposed epidemic,
Judge Jack points out that "the CDC and NIOSH issued an outbreak alert in 1988 for 10 cases
of silicosis in Ector County, Texas, and for a single death from acute silicosis in Ohio in 1992."
Id. (emphasis added).
47. See John Shaffery & Gary Och, Welding Rod Injury and its Current Litigation: A Brief
Overview, Toxic TORT WATCH, Mar. 2004, at 6, 64-65.
48. ROBERT KOORT ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS EQUITY RESEARCH, WELDING ROD LITIGATION:
UNLIKELY TO BECOMETHE'NEXTASBESTOS' (2004), available at http://www.gawda.org/eSeries/
Customer/Source/gawda-members/Resurces/newsletters/Goldman-WeldingRdLitigatin.pd.
49. Id. at 2-3. Koort et al. did cite some factors, such as difficulty meeting the commonality
required of class actions, which vitiate against the probability of mass tort litigation in the
near future. See id. at 3. A 2003 plaintiffs' victory, however, demonstrated that plaintiffs can
overcome these hurdles and welding-rod litigation could indeed grow in the future. Id.
50. See Brian Brueggemann, Lawsuit Blames Welding for Illness, BELLEVILLE NEWS-
DEMOCRAT (Ill.), Oct. 13, 2003, at 1A, available at http://www.belleville.com/mldbelleville/
archives/ (search "Lawsuit Blames Welding for Illness").
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$10,000 per day for the screening, and had received a total of
$270,000 as of October 2003."' As a result of these screenings, the
doctor claims to have found a dramatically increased risk of
Parkinson's-type disease among current and former welders; he is
careful, however, to acknowledge that no published study supports
his findings." The similarity between these allegedly widespread
welding-related neurological deficits and the overdiagnosis of silica
injuries as pointed out by Judge Jack is striking: if the welding
mass screening is taken at face value, there appears to be yet
another enormous public health risk that is receiving virtually no
attention from recognized national health authorities like the CDC
or NIOSH. Statistical analysis and follow-up studies have shown
that silica claims were absurdly overstated;5 3 time will tell whether
the welding claims follow a similar path.
II. CONSEQUENCES: WHY 'DIAGNOSING FOR DOLLARS" IS A BAD
THING
The purpose of this Note is not to argue that mass screening is
necessarily corrupt or undesirable. In fact, one court noted:
Advertising and the use of technology and large scale operations
by lawyers to improve efficiency and provide service to a large
community-here those exposed to asbestos, injured and with a
recognized substantive cause of action-is generally considered
commendable under our capitalistic-entrepreneurial regime and
ethical under our professional-legal system.54
Nevertheless, as the above examples have illustrated, mass
screening for asbestos and other toxic torts is a much different
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
54. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
7.2 (2003); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (McKinney 2001); STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 398,968
(2002); RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
746-56 (2d ed. 2001)); see also In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 627 (S.D.
Tex. 2005) ("[I1t is worth noting that there is nothing inherently wrong with a mass screening
... )
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animal than screenings sometimes used to diagnose common
diseases." Indeed, notwithstanding the potential benefits of well-
conducted screening procedures, dubious methods have, without
doubt, been employed in numerous lawsuits.6 Those screenings
have contributed to the explosion of the asbestos litigation.57 That
litigation, in turn, has had a devastating impact not only on the
asbestos industry,5" but also on related industries. 9
A. Judicial Waste
Nowhere has the judicial waste incurred by mass screening been
more well-documented and notorious than in asbestos litigation.
In 1990, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist
appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation to examine
the litigation's effect on the judicial system and to propose
solutions.' The Committee concluded that the asbestos litigation
was overwhelming both state and federal court dockets, resulting in
delayed trials, relentlessly relitigated issues, and reduced plaintiff
compensation due to high transaction costs.6 ' These conclusions
55. See Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The
Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 63 & n.89 (2003).
56. See supra Part I.
57. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CML JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION 23 (2002).
58. See In re Joint E. & S. Dists., 237 F. Supp. 2d at 305 C'Claims for compensation for
asbestos-related injuries have already cost businesses over 50 billion dollars through the end
of 2000. It has been estimated that- the cost of such claims to business will ultimately reach
at least $200 billion.... At least 60 companies have been driven into bankruptcy primarily by
asbestos claims, with the pace of bankruptcy filings accelerating markedly in recent years.");
see also Brickman, supra note 21, at 834-35 (providing examples of the impact of asbestos
litigation and predicting that the worst may be yet to come).
59. See Richard 0. Faulk, Dispelling the Myths of the Asbestos Litigation: Solutions for
Common Law Courts, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 945, 950 (2003) ("Twenty years ago, only 300
defendants were involved in asbestos litigation. Current lawsuits name more than 8,000
defendants. Many of these defendants had no role in the manufacturing of asbestos products
or their distribution into the stream of commerce." (footnotes omitted)); see also JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ ET AL., AM. INS. ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF ASBESTOS LIABILITIES ON WORKERS IN
BANKRUPT FIRMS 3 (2002) (finding that asbestos bankruptcies have led to the loss of 52,000
to 60,000 jobs, with each displaced worker losing $25,000 to $50,000 in wages over his or her
career and about $8300 in pension loss).
60. Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1828 (1992).
61. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (citing REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2-3 (1991)).
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underscore the notion that an overloaded court system is detrimen-
tal not only to the courts themselves, but also to those litigants
seeking relief.
B. Dilution of Legitimate Claims
That many claims are false does not mean there are not real,
injured claimants deserving remedies. 62 These legitimate claim-
ants, not only the defendant corporations, are harmed by mass
screenings and the influx of meritless claims they can produce.
For instance, in the fen-phen litigation, doctors auditing claims
submitted to the trust found fifty cases in which "patients had
actually suffered moderate or severe aortic valve damage that had
gone undiagnosed."' Clearly, mass screening's unreliability leads
to both over-diagnosing and under-diagnosing.
The administration of the Manville Trust for asbestos claimants
also confronted the problem of frivolous claims taking both
credence and award money from truly injured people. After
meritless asbestosis claims forced the Trust to impose stricter
evidentiary requirements for awards, many plaintiffs' attorneys
called for even stricter requirements."
C. Impact on Falsely Diagnosed Plaintiffs
Finally, even if most cases fall far short of an unneeded, major
transplant surgery," falsely diagnosing people with potentially
62. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Of
course, saying that the Plaintiffs do not have diagnoses is not to say that none of the ...
Plaintiffs have silicosis.... The point is that because the lawyers short-circuited the
appropriate diagnostic process ... there is no reliable basis for believing that every Plaintiff
has silicosis.').
63. Frankel, supra note 33, at 133. Frankel goes on to describe "one horrifying case, [in
which] a patient whose condition was overstated for the sake of obtaining payment through
the trust ended up having unnecessary heart valve replacement surgery." Id.
64. See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 319-26 (E.D.N.Y.
2002). One plaintiffs' attorney, concerned that the new trust system would favor unimpaired
claimants over those most seriously injured, argued, among other things, that the trust should
ensure that diagnostic examinations are "real physical examinations of the quality required
by ... workers' compensation boards" and that further research on the best testing methods
was ' badly needed." Id. at 328.
65. See supra note 63.
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devastating diseases does impose real costs.66 These individual costs
are easily lost or overlooked within the scope of lawsuits that can
comprise hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. Such costs defy easy
quantification, but logically must exist."
III. Do WE NEED A SOLUTION?
An observer with a good understanding of American substantive
and procedural law, but without the benefit of knowing anything
about the mass torts described in this Note, might find it hard to
believe that there is any need for increased regulation of mass
screening. In other words, it is already against the rules. But
current law, as this Part will demonstrate, is insufficient to protect
against the harms caused by mass tort screening.
A. Daubert
The Supreme Court established in its landmark case, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., that trial courts should exclude
"at the outset" expert scientific testimony unless the "reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and...
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts
in issue."68 Daubert and its progeny69 have further refined those
requirements to include, among other things, that a scientific expert
"employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."7 Judge
Jack pounced on this requirement in excluding plaintiff experts in
the silica Multi-District Litigation (MDL).71
66. See In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 636-37 ("In the case of the Plaintiffs who are
healthy, at least some of them can be expected to have taken their diagnoses seriously. They
can be expected to have reported their diagnoses when applying for health insurance and life
insurance, to their employers and to ... their families and friends.").
67. See id.
68. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (emphasis added).
69. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997).
70. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
71. See In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 622; see also Frankel, supra note 33, at 99
("[Dr.] Crouse found that the echocardiograms of 60-70 percent of the [law firm] clients her
office tested exhibited disease ... compared to the 5 percent she found in a blinded clinical
study ...."); supra note 39.
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Though Daubert undeniably provides defendants with an
important weapon, it is by no means a cure-all. First, not all states
have adopted the evidentiary tenets of Daubert,72 and the ones that
have do not all apply its principles uniformly.73 Second, the strategy
of many mass tort lawyers appears to be to file enough claims to
overwhelm defendants and extract "nuisance-value settlements.7 4
If cases are settled prior to extensive litigation, Daubert will not
help much. Furthermore, Daubert hearing fees can be very expen-
sive for defendants;75 thus, even a successful challenge does not
completely avoid waste on meritless claims.
B. Model Rules
Of course, it almost goes without saying that the ABA's Model
Rules already prohibit attorneys from bringing false claims, 76
unnecessarily multiplying litigation, or resorting to the sort of
fraudulent mass-screening techniques seen in asbestos and fen-
phen. Further, many states have applicable standards far more
stringent than those suggested in the Model Rules.77 Given the
current landscape of mass tort litigation, however, the conclusion
that the Model Rules and their state corollaries are insufficient is
inescapable.
72. David E. Bernstein, Disinterested in Daubert. State Courts Lag Behind in Opposing
"Junk"Science, LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Wash. Legal Found.), June 21,2002, at 1-2, available
at http://www.wlf.org/upload/6-21-02Bernstein.pdf (identifyingAlabama, Arizona, California,
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).
73. Id. (discussing, as examples, Oregon and West Virginia cases that purported to
embrace Daubert but ignored essential guidance from Kumho).
74. In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
75. See id. at 678 (estimating defendants' attorney costs at $275,000 per day). Though all
litigation is expensive, these costs are particularly galling considering they are expended only
to dispose of meritless claims.
76. See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.1 (2006) ("A lawyer shall not bring
a proceeding ... unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous ....").
77. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West 2005) ("Every trial court may order
a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
..... ); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-421 (2005) ("An attorney or party to any court proceeding who,
in the determination of the court, multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorney fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.").
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C. Sanctions
Sanctions for attorney misconduct are already available through
a number of avenues.78 In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 appears
especially relevant:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct."9
Despite the apparent perfect fit between § 1927 and mass screen-
ings, the sanctions avenue has not yet been used to its full potential.
For instance, Judge Jack's silica opinion was severely critical of the
attorneys' conduct, but even her sanctions were, as she noted, paltry
compared to the costs reasonably incurred because of the unreliable
diagnostic procedures.80
V. A THREE-PRONGED SOLUTION
A. Legislative
Perhaps the most intuitive solution to the problem of mass
tort medical screening is comprehensive federal legislation. The
Supreme Court recognized this solution in the asbestos context a
decade ago,8' and practitioners have recommended similar solutions
to nonasbestos mass torts.8 2 Despite this recommendation, the only
federal legislative effort approaching the level of reform needed to
78. See, e.g., supra note 77.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
80. See In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
81. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (stating that the "elephantine
mass of asbestos cases ... defies customary judicial administration and calls for national
legislation'); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) ('The argument is
sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the
most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.").
82. See, e.g., JAMES L. STENGEL, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, MASS TORT
SCREENINGS: THE LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 1-10 (2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.org/pdfs/Stengelpdf.pdf (presenting several legislative reform options).
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curtail mass-screening abuse is the as-yet unenacted Fairness in
Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006 ("FAIR Act" or "Act"). 3
The FAIR Act, however, is limited to the asbestos litigation and
therefore will not cure screening abuses found in other mass torts.
Despite its limited scope, the Act is instructive as an example of
why federal legislation cannot be relied on to solve the mass-
screening problem.
First, it should be noted that the Act's substantive provisions
would go a long way toward fixing the problem. By creating a
"national asbestos injury claims resolution program,"' the Act is
intended to supplant all other forms of asbestos-related com-
pensation.' The most immediate and obvious consequence of
that provision would be to relieve federal and state courts of their
overwhelming asbestos-related case load. More important for
purposes of this Note, however, is the claims resolution program
itself.
Paramount to the Act's procedural reform is the establishment of
the "Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation," the mandate for the
appointment of an administrator of that office,' and the creation of
an "Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund."87 The administrator
would be responsible generally for the administration of the funds
to claimants and all the necessarily related bureaucratic matters."
Although this process might initially sound disturbingly similar
to the infamous fen-phen fund,89 the Act has built-in safeguards
designed to prevent similar abuses. These safeguards are the
provisions most relevant to the issue of mass screening. First, the
Act provides for the creation of a Medical Advisory Committee to
assist the Fund Administrator in creating injury standards and
diagnostic protocols.9 To ensure the integrity of the committee, the
83. Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong. (2006).
Although the Act is getting attention in the Senate, it appears stalled in the House. See FAIR
Act of 2005, H.R. 1360, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access. gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid--f:h1360ih.txt.pdf.
84. S. 3274 § 2(7).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 101.
87. Id. § 221.
88. Id. § 101.
89. See supra Part I.B.
90. FAIR Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong. §§ 103, 405(b)(6) (2006).
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Act would limit its membership to individuals who have not received
more than fifteen percent of their income from asbestos consulting
for the previous five years.9' Second, and perhaps more important,
the Act would confer significant authority on the Administrator to
"develop methods for auditing and evaluating the medical ...
evidence" and to exclude medical evidence from physicians or
facilities employing methods "not consistent with prevailing medical
practices."92 The Act, thus, does not merely allow the Administrator
to audit and exclude individual, unreliable diagnoses, but rather
allows the exclusion of all evidence from a particular physician or
facility.
The Act also grants the Administrator authority with real teeth,
allowing not only exclusion of evidence, but also the imposition of,
among other penalties, a $10,000 fine9" on "any person or entity
found to have submitted or engaged in a materially false, fraudu-
lent, or fictitious statement or practice."94 The Act, therefore,
contains both safeguards to prevent the submission of specious
claims and punishments severe enough to deter claimants or their
lawyers from attempting to make such claims.
The FAIR Act, however, cannot solve the problems of mass-
medical screening for a couple of reasons. First, the Act is obviously
aimed specifically at asbestos. As a result, its underlying purpose is
to establish a fund from which all future asbestos claims will be
paid.95 This solution does not address future litigation in other
areas.' The most damning problem with the FAIR Act, however, is
that it is not yet binding law.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 115.
93. See id. § 101 (describing the Administrator's duties to include "excluding evidence and
disqualifying or debarring any attorney, physician, provider of medical or diagnostic services,
including laboratories and others who provide evidence in support of a claimant's application
for compensation where the Administrator determines that materially false, fraudulent, or
fictitious statements or practices have been submitted or engaged in by such individuals or
entities; and ... having all other powers incidental, necessary, or appropriate to carrying out
the functions of the Office").
94. Id.
95. Id. § 2.
96. The FAIR Act will not, for example, preclude the application of the same diagnostic
techniques and mass litigation strategies to the "next asbestos."
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Although the Act was originally introduced in May of 2003,
neither the Senate nor the House has passed it.97 The political
difficulty in passing the FAIR Act, which is aimed squarely at the
widely recognized problem of asbestos litigation, underscores the
notion that relying on federal reform to cure the ills of medical mass
screening is unrealistic. Indeed, much of the opposition to the FAIR
Act comes, not exclusively from the plaintiffs bar, but rather, from
the asbestos industry9" and its insurers.' Opponents point out that
the Act's funding structure is uncertain and argue that the bill
would favor big companies over smaller ones and unconstitutionally
take insurance companies' assets in an arbitrary way." This
opposition stems in part from the Act's failure to realize hopes for
forward-looking legislation narrowly aimed at setting standards for
medical diagnoses.' 1 Nevertheless, it is remarkable that a proposal
for a federal asbestos solution, which the Supreme Court urged as
early as 1990,102 has had such difficulty gaining support.
Given the history of the FAIR Act, it seems unrealistic to believe
that federal reform calling for specific diagnostic protocols in all
litigation is a solution with any potential to be adopted in the near
future. A more practical solution may be to focus legislative efforts
on individual states. Further, this approach has the advantage of
allowing different states to experiment with different approaches,
thereby providing valuable examples for an eventual federal
approach.10 3 Indeed, several states have already enacted the type of
97. Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos Litigation: The FAIR Act Two Years On, 1 PRA2r's J.
BANKR. L. 207, 207, 209 (2005), available at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/getfile.aspx?
filepath=/Files/publications/hanlon_p_08_05.pdf.
98. The phrase "asbestos industry" must be read with the understanding that the asbestos
litigation has sucked in many companies only tangentially related to the actual
manufacturers of asbestos.
99. See Coalition for Asbestos Reform Opposes FAIR Act, INS. J., Apr. 22, 2005, httpi/
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/04/22/54201.htm.
100. See id.
101. See id. ("Coalition members ... support efforts to enact medical criteria legislation, an
approach that has already proven at the state level to reduce costs and provide finality for
defendants, neither of which will result from the Specter-Leahy FAIR Act.").
102. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text.
103. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
('t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
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medical-screening- and diagnosis-focused legislation crucial to the
elimination of mass-screening abuses.
10 4
At first blush, these state statutes seem to fall victim to the same
problem (aside from lack of political momentum) as the FAIR Act:
the statutes address asbestos and silica claims exclusively. Unlike
the federal regulation, however, these statutes do not propose to
eliminate an asbestos- or silica-related cause of action through the
creation of an administrative fund; rather, the Florida, Georgia,
Ohio, and Texas statutes set forth rigid criteria for the claimant
diagnoses. °5
Although the various state statutes differ in many respects, their
fundamental requirements share much in common. First, each of
the statutes mandates the submission of "prima facie evidence" of
impairment, usually in the form of a written report, early on in the
litigation.'6 Second, the substance of this required evidence is quite
similar in the states with such statutes: all diagnoses must be
conducted by a qualified physician." 7 The statutes then set forth
104. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 774.201 to .209 (West Supp. 2006) (codifying the Asbestos and
Silica Compensation Fairness Act); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-1 to -14-10 (Supp. 2006) (governing
asbestos and silica claims); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.84 to .902 (West Supp. 2006)
(governing silica and mixed dust claims); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.91 to .98 (West Supp.
2006) (governing asbestos claims); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 90.001 to .012
(Vernon Supp. 2006) (governing asbestos and silica claims).
105. It is interesting to note that far prior to the adoption of these legislative reforms,
courts presiding over mass tort cases were forced to take similar tacks. For instance, Judge
Weinstein, presiding over the distribution of the Manville Trust, approved additional
evidentiary amendments to the Trust's claim requirements. See Brickman, supra note 55, at
136. These amendments, which contained requirements similar to the state legislative efforts,
were criticized by some plaintiffs' lawyers, specifically those representing "seriously ill
claimants," as insufficiently rigid. See id. at 137. These attorneys' concerns stemmed from the
diversion of Trust asset from the truly sick to those who remained unimpaired. See id.
106. Florida requires the submission of a written report and supporting test results with
the complaint or initial pleading. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.205(2) (West Supp. 2006). Georgia
requires submission of prima facie evidence of physical impairment before the commencement
of any discovery (except for that related to the establishment or challenge of the prima facie
evidence). GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-7(a) (Supp. 2006). Similarly, Ohio requires the showing of
prima facie evidence within thirty days of filing the complaint. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.93(A)(1) (West Supp. 2006). Texas mandates the filing of a report within thirty days of
the defendant's answer or entering of appearance. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
90.006(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006); see also id. §§ 96.003..004.
107. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.204 (West Supp. 2006) ("qualified physician"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-14-2 (Supp. 2006) ("qualified physician"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.92 (West
Supp. 2006) ("competent medical authority"). The Texas statute does not have any similar
language, but does include many other requirements for diagnosing physicians. See, e.g., TEX.
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detailed definitions for qualified physicians. Those definitions
range from mandatory board certification to the prohibition of
reliance on any diagnoses, screenings, or reports that were "con-
ducted in violation of any law, regulation, licensing requirement, or
medical code of practice."'' 8 Further, the definitions generally
require that a "qualified physician" actually have a "doctor-patient
relationship" with the exposed individual.109 Finally, the statutes
exclude from the ranks of "qualified physicians" those who spend
more than a certain percentage of their time consulting for civil
litigation or generating more than a certain percentage of their
practice's revenue from such consulting. °
The requirement for basic, prima facie evidence supported by a
diagnosis from a "qualified physician" serves several purposes.'
Perhaps the most obvious is to ensure that plaintiffs provide
credible evidence of actual, physical impairment. 2 This require-
ment, of course, is specifically geared to deal with the asbestos
litigation; nevertheless, such a mandate is equally applicable to any
disease involving a long latency period. By limiting cases to those
claimants suffering from actual, physical impairment, the statutes
Cirv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 90.003 to .004 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
108. TEX. CIrv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.005(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
109. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.203(23)(a)(2) (defining"qualified physician" to require
"a doctor-patient relationship" with the plaintiff); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.91(Z)(2)
(requiring same for "competent medical authority").
110. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-2(17)(A) (Supp. 2006) (qualified physician cannot
spend more than ten percent of professional activity consulting for civil litigation and
physician's overall practice cannot earn more than twenty percent of revenue providing such
services); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.91(Z)(4) (West Supp. 2006) (competent medical
authority cannot spend more than twenty-five percent of professional activity consulting for
civil litigation and physician's overall practice cannot earn more than twenty percent of
revenue providing such services).
111. Note that the provisions described are only a few of the many requirements imposed
by these state statutes. The statutes also require plaintiffs to meet detailed asbestos- and
silica-specific threshold diagnostic requirements. See, e.g., TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 90.003 to .004 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
112. The statutes generally expand the statute of limitations to provide that the limitation
period does not begin to run until the exposed individual has a cause of action under the
statute. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.94(A) (West Supp. 2006). This provision
eliminates the need to file a claim as soon as the individual learns of any asbestos-related
injury which does not cause impairment. Such claims may account for much of the current
asbestos case load. See CARROLL ETAL., supra note 57, at 22, 45 (discussing the large number
of claims for nonmalignant injuries and injuries causing "little or no functional impairment").
For this reason, postponing the running of the statute of limitations until the onset of actual
impairment likely would reduce this caseload.
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reserve judicial resources and corporate money for those claimants
that need it most. Furthermore, the limitation cuts the potential
litigant pool so dramatically as to eliminate the need for mass
screening."'
Even if the statutes could not cut the demand for mass-litigant
screening,14 the substantive requirements for the prima facie case
preclude the sort of mass-production efficiency responsible for
asbestos and silica screening abuses. In particular, the requirement
of a diagnosis by a qualified physician both drastically increases
the cost of an individual diagnosis and is a requirement that is
easily transferable to litigation contexts outside the asbestos arena.
Several criteria for a "qualified physician" contribute to the effects,
but two requirements, in particular, deserve special attention.
The first of these is the requirement that a qualified physician
have a "doctor-patient relationship" with the exposed individual."5
Indeed, the Ohio statute goes even further, mandating that the
doctor actually have treated the exposed individual."6 The specific
depths of the "doctor-patient relationship" hardly need be explored
to realize that mass tort medical screening does not fit the bill.
Consider the testimony of one highly credentialed diagnosing
physician in the silica litigation: "I was not practicing medicine ... I
was providing diagnostic information in the context of medical/legal
consultation.""' This type of diagnosis-only relationship would not
qualify under the state statutes.
The emphasis on treatment found in the Ohio and other statutes
will not only deter mass screening and the ensuing flood of
113. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 57, at 20 ("Several ... recent studies have found
fractions of unimpaired claimants ranging from two-thirds to up to 90 percent of all current
claimants.").
114. In cases in which immediate impairment is alleged, for instance, the demand for such
screening would remain. See, e.g., supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. The welding
litigation's appetite for mass screening, for example, would not be diminished by relaxed
statute of limitations provisions because the injuries that are alleged to cause immediate
impairment. With a large class of currently impaired claimants, the demand for mass
screening remains.
115. See supra note 109.
116. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2307.91(Z)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
117. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citing
Transcript of Daubert Hearings at 56-57, In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, No. MDL
1553 (Feb. 16, 2005)). This testimony was echoed by other physicians in the litigation, one
who opined that he was applying "a legal standard and not a real diagnosis." Id.
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impairment-free claims; it will also help those individuals with
legitimate claims. Rather than being drawn by advertising to a
mass screening that emphasizes the manufacture of thousands of
claims, these individuals may visit doctors capable of, and willing to,
offer real treatment.
The second requirement of particular relevance to non-asbestos
mass tort litigation is the limit on the amount of time qualified
physicians may spend consulting in civil litigations."' Likely
enacted in response to the litigation-linked diagnostic industries
that sprung up around asbestos," 9 silica, 2 ° and fen-phen liti-
gation,'2 ' this limitation eliminates the demand for those industries
and increases the likelihood of unbiased diagnoses.
Both of these statutory elements-the requirement for doctor-
patient relationships and the limitation on litigation consulting
time-will likely have positive effects on the standard of care
received by legitimately impaired individuals. The effectiveness
of these measures in reducing mass-screening abuse, however, will
likely result from their impact on the cost of implementing
conforming diagnoses. Without these requirements, a single doctor
may diagnose hundreds or even thousands of patients and earn
most of his income from this practice.'22 Without the efficiencies of
mass-produced claims, plaintiffs' lawyers will be unlikely to spend
significant amounts of money diagnosing those with little or no
impairment because the potential for a return on that investment
would be tenuous or nonexistent.
As evidenced by the above comparison with existing asbestos
reform statutes, a state-by-state legislative solution offers many
attractive possibilities. The success of those statutes will stem from
the resulting dramatic increase in the cost of mass screenings.'23
118. See supra note 110.
119. See Brickman, supra note 55, at 81 (describing the creation of multiple companies for
the sole purpose of providing asbestos screening X-rays and pulmonary tests).
120. See In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 580 & n.26, 581 (detailing the methods of
one screening company employed by plaintiff firms to provide X-rays for silicosis diagnoses).
121. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (describing how one doctor
reviewed 1200 cases in seventy-two hours and diagnosed 800 life threatening illnesses in the
process); id. at 587 (one physician stating his motivation to participate in the screening
process was "easy money").
123. This result would presumably end mass screenings. See id. at 635 ("[Tjhese diagnoses
were driven by neither health nor justice: they were manufactured for money."); Raymark
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This solution, however, will not independently end all future
dubious mass-medical screenings.
The first shortcoming of the legislative solution is an obvious but
frequently fatal one: before legislation can do anything, it must be
enacted. In spite of the fact that screening abuses in asbestos
litigation have been documented since at least the early 1990s, 124
only four states have passed legislation to curtail these practices.
Furthermore, even those states did so only in the last two years.'25
Finally, unless all states enact similar reforms, plaintiffs' attorneys
will simply move their screening enterprises to new jurisdictions.
Although those jurisdictions may ultimately decide to enact reform
measures, in the meantime thousands of meritless, or at least
impairment-less, suits may be filed.
Opposition to asbestos tort reform has apparently been successful
in holding off these statutes for quite some time; the legislation this
Note proposes, however, would be even broader. Not restricted to a
single type of lawsuit, the legislative efforts this Note proposes
would cut across every type of claim. It is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that such legislation would engender even more strenu-
ous opposition while garnering perhaps less vehement support. 126
On the other hand, in some respects legislation aimed at a
broader range of lawsuits would impose less stringent requirements.
Such statutes would be limited to requiring basic formalities, 27 but
could not back those formalities with disease-specific diagnostic
requirements. Although this lack of specificity may be a positive in
the eyes of tort-reform opposition, it may create gaps large enough
to allow unreliable diagnoses to continue to act as the basis for
lawsuits. Obviously, then, legislative reform cannot act alone.
Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *13 (D. Kan. May 30, 1990) ("In
sum, it appears that this unusual, distasteful and disappointing case emanates from the
attorneys' greed, which has clouded their professional judgment, i.e., their indifference as to
whether any of the 6,000 claims meet professional standards or not.").
124. See, e.g., Raymark, 1990 WL 72588, at *1.
125. The Ohio statute was enacted in 2004; the other three statutes were enacted in 2005.
See supra notes 16, 104.
126. Without the pressure of constant media attention declaring a crisis, legislation dealing
with nonasbestos abuses may not attract as much attention.
127. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of such formalities.
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B. Independent Regulations
An effective complement to state tort reform would need to
meet two primary needs: filling the diagnosis-specific gaps left by
general statutory requirements, and having some chance of working
independently should such legislative reforms prove politically
impossible. A solution that provided only disease-specific protocols
for diagnosis would have little use if employed in a state with no
requirement that this diagnosis be made by a doctor uninvolved in
litigation; the protocols would simply change the assembly-line
process used in mass screening.
Such a complement actually already exists in Federal Rule of
Evidence 706. Under the Rule, a court may "on its own motion ...
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection."'28 Although Rule 706
provides a specific example of a court's authority to appoint its own
expert, a variety of sources have been invoked in support of this
power.'29 The Supreme Court has recognized and recommended the
practice of calling court-appointed experts as a potentially useful
one in the post-Daubert age of scientific gate-keeping. 30
Despite these recommendations, the use of court-appointed
experts appears to be relatively uncommon.' 3' The Federal Judicial
128. FED. R. EvID. 706.
129. Robert E. Thackston, Esq., Andrews Continuing Legal Educ. Institute, Continuing
Legal Education Presentation: Court-appointed Experts in Toxic Tort Litigation (May 4,
1998), 1998 WL 34182437 (ANCLE), at *2 ("Federal courts cite a variety of authority for
appointing their own experts, also called 'advisors' or 'technical advisors': 'inherent authority;'
Federal Rule of Evidence 706, 'Court-Appointed Experts;' Federal Rule of Evidence 104,
'Preliminary Questions' and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, Tasters.' Federal courts have
long had 'virtually unquestioned' inherent power to appoint their own experts. Despite the
existence of a specific rule on appointment of experts, some courts cite only their 'inherent
authority."' (footnotes omitted)).
130. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) ("Throughout, a
judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful
of other applicable rules.... Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance
of an expert of its own choosing."); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-50
(1997) ("[A] judge could better fulfill [his or her] gatekeeper function if he or she had help from
scientists. Judges should be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent
authority ... to appoint experts .... Reputable experts could be recommended to courts by
established scientific organizations, such as the National Academy of Sciences or the
American Association for the Advancement of Science.") (quoting with approval Brief of Amici
Curiae The New England Journal of Medicine and Marcia Angell, M.D., in Support of Neither
Petitioners nor Respondents at 18-19, Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. 136 (May 30, 1997) (No. 96-188)).
131. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.5 (1985).
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Center researched the use of court-appointed experts by sending
short surveys to all 537 active district court judges. 132 The responses
indicated that roughly twenty percent, or eighty-six, of the respond-
ing judges had appointed experts. 13 Only five of the reported cases
involved experts addressing causation issues in toxic tort cases.
13 4
The appointment of experts in mass torts-the types of cases most
likely to involve the screenings of thousands of potential claim-
ants-was thus quite rare.
The Judicial Center researchers identified four primary reasons
for the judicial reluctance to appoint experts: infrequent need,
respect for the adversarial system,135 difficulty in assessing costs
and the "awkward problem" of having to require parties to compen-
sate the court-appointed expert, 13 and the trouble inherent in
locating truly neutral experts. 137 These concerns, however, are either
not applicable to the mass tort context or otherwise answerable for
several reasons. First, experience and common sense both dictate
that mass tort cases invariably require expert opinion to decide
causation issues. These cases frequently involve "a procession of
persons with impeccable credentials and persuasive testimony ...
[who] will reach diametrically opposite viewpoints depending upon
which side they testify for."138 Though in most cases, courts may
seldom have need to appoint experts, mass torts are an exception.
Second, thirty-nine of the responding judges cited "[r]espect for
the adversarial system" as a reason to avoid appointing experts. 139
The rationale underlying this "respect" was essentially that both
parties can provide their own experts, cross-examine the opposing
expert, and any differences in opinion will then be resolved by the
jury. Again, however, this reasoning may not be sound when applied
132. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 & n.33
(1994). Four hundred thirty-one of the judges responded. Id.
133. Id. at 1004.
134. Id. at 1006.
135. Id. at 1015-20.
136. Id. at 1045-55.
137. Id. at 1022-23.
138. Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation,
137 FED. RULES DECISIONS 35, 35 (1991) (arguing that the development of the "expert-
advocate" and the likelihood that battling experts may confuse juries is a good reason for
courts to appoint neutral experts).
139. Cecil & Willging, supra note 132, at 1018-19.
2066 [Vol. 48:2043
DERAILING THE GRAVY TRAIN
to the mass tort context. The extent of the fraud alleged in the
Raymark case, the Silica MDL, and the fen-phen trust belies the
notion that opposing experts represent merely "differences of
opinion."'4 ° Instead, these cases represent total breakdowns of the
adversarial system.
Third, the logistical need to apportion the appointed expert's
costs among parties has been a hindrance to some judges."' Rule
706 grants the trial judge wide discretion in allocating the costs of
the expert,'42 and although a judge may be unsure how to apportion
costs if one of the parties is indigent,"' cases involving the mass
screening of plaintiffs, however, are not typically ones with indigent
parties unable to afford the cost of an additional expert.'44 In the
mass tort context, either an equal splitting of costs or some alloca-
tion based on the outcome of the case would therefore be a workable
solution.
Finally, the Judicial Center's research found that many judges
had reservations about the practicality of finding experts that are
truly neutral.'45 Unlike the three concerns mentioned above, this
problem could actually be more significant in the mass tort context.
As seen in asbestos and fen-phen litigation, these suits can quickly
assume monstrous proportions and involve tens of thousands of
plaintiffs. Along with these thousands of plaintiffs come hundreds
of lawyers and dozens of experts. In short, it may actually be
logistically difficult to find experts without a conflict.
Yet this problem may not be as bad as it sounds. First, it is worth
noting that Judge Rubin found experts in an asbestos case that were
neutral by contacting several national health-related agencies.'46
Neutral experts, thus, are available. More important, the need
140. See supra Part I.
141. Cecil & Willging, supra note 132, at 1045-56.
142. FED. R. EVID. 706(b) ("[In civil actions not including just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment)] the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such
time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.").
143. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 132, at 55-56.
144. Id. at 1052-53. While Rule 706 allows for expenses to fall on the nonindigent party,
judges typically first require the Plaintiffs claim to have merit. Id.; see also David Medine,
The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
281 (1990).
145. Cecil & Willging, supra note 132, at 1022 ("Several judges doubted that such
testimony would be truly neutral, even if the expert was invited to testify by the court.").
146. See Rubin & Ringenbach, supra note 138, at 38.
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for such an independent search may now be obviated by the
establishment of a program by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science designed to match experts to lawsuits. 147 If
judges are less hesitant to appoint such experts, more programs like
the Academy's will likely be created, 141 lessening the difficulty of
finding neutral and qualified experts.
Although appointing independent experts in mass tort cases is
far from commonplace, several judges have successfully done so. 149
Judge Carl Rubin of the Southern District of Ohio appointed experts
to testify in a series of asbestos cases in the late 1980s.150 Judge
Rubin queried the American Medical Association, the American
Thoracic Society, the American Board of Internal Medicine, and
other national groups to find potential expert candidates.''
Importantly, the candidates were excluded if they had any previous
association with the asbestos industry or litigation.'52 Once selected,
the experts were provided with all relevant plaintiff records and
ultimately testified at the trial."3
Perhaps the most striking result of Judge Rubin's use of court-
appointed experts is the correlation between the court expert's
opinion and the disposition of the case: the jury decided in accor-
dance with the independent expert in thirteen of sixteen cases.14
Furthermore, the independent expert found that nearly two-thirds
of the plaintiffs were "free of any condition giving rise to a cause of
action."'55 The implications of these findings are obvious: not
only did neutral experts find that a majority of claimants had no
147. See The Role of Science in Making Good Decisions: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Science, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Mark S. Frankel, Director, Program on Scientific
Freedom, Responsibility and Law, American Association for the Advancement of Science),
available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/testim/mftest.htm; see also Thomas E.
Willging, Mass Tort Problems and Proposals: A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, 187
FED. RULES DECISIONS 328, 377-79 (1999).
148. Indeed, Duke Law School's Private Adjudication Center established a similar program.
See Willging, supra note 147, at 379.
149. The examples that follow are not intended to be an exhaustive list of court-appointed
experts in tort litigation, but rather a few examples illustrative of the practice's promise for
eliminating the advantage gained by dubious screening methods.
150. See Rubin & Ringenbach, supra note 138, at 37-42 & apps. I-VI.
151. Id. at 38.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 40.
154. Id. at 41.
155. Id. at 39.
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actionable injury, but those experts were credible enough that
juries believed them.'
Judge Rubin's use of court-appointed experts, however, occurred
prior to the Supreme Court's Daubert decision and the resulting
changes in admissibility standards for scientific and technical
evidence. Whereas he employed the neutral expert as a sort of third-
party expert-an alternative to the parties' experts--courts since
Daubert have focused the use of independent experts on assisting
the judge in Daubert and summary judgment hearings."l 7
This practice was used extensively in breast implant cases.
Multiple trial courts appointed panels of experts, as did Judge
Samuel C. Pointer, Jr., who presided over the federal breast implant
cases, consolidated into Multi-District Litigation."' s An Oregon trial
judge, Robert Jones, appointed independent medical "advisors" in
the fields of epidemiology, immunology/toxicology, rheumatology,
and chemistry.'59 Unlike in Judge Rubin's asbestos trials, however,
Judge Jones appointed the experts pursuant to Rule 104, in order
"[t]o keep [them] independent of any ongoing proceedings...."'" After
the parties submitted materials for the experts to review, a four-day
hearing was held, during which both sides' experts were questioned
by the court-appointed experts.' 6 ' Once the hearings were com-
pleted, questions were submitted to the independent experts, who
generated a report.' Finally, based on that report, Judge Jones
156. Of course, the significant correlation between the independent expert's opinion and
the ultimate decision of the jury may lend credence to the argument that the use of such
experts is harmful to the adversarial system and results in jurors abdicating their decision-
making role. Cf. Cecil & Wiliging, supra note 132, at 1019-20 (discussing judges' concern
about abdicating their decision-making role to expert witnesses). Such an argument posits
that court-appointed experts possess an "aura of infallibility to which they are not entitled."
FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's notes (citing Elwood S. Levy, Impartial Medical
Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMPLE L.Q. 416 (1961)). This concern is one applicable to all expert
testimony, however, and any increased credibility resulting from the perceived impartiality
of a court-appointed expert is a comparatively benign result.
157. See Thackston, supra note 129, at *2 (discussing alternative uses of experts, such as
having an expert meet with the judge in chambers only, "as a technical advisor, in the nature
of a law clerk, ... [for] free-wheeling discussion" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158. Id. at *5.
159. Id.
160. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.8 (D. Or. 1996).
161. Id. at 1393-94.
162. Id. at 1394-95.
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granted the defendants' motions in limine to exclude the plaintiffs'
expert causation testimony. 6 '
Court appointed experts played very different roles in Judge
Rubin's asbestos trials and Judges Jones's and Pointer's breast
implant hearings. Both methods of employing experts-as trial
witnesses and as Daubert hearing consultants-hold significant
promise as a solutions to the mass-screening problem. If used as an
actual trial witness, the independent expert would render it very
difficult for plaintiff attorneys to pass off mass-manufactured
diagnoses as legitimate. The use of expert panels would have a
similar result.
To be most effective, however, neutral experts must be appointed
in toxic-tort cases with regularity. If there exists only a remote
chance of the appointment of an independent expert, as is the
situation currently, the expectation of the resulting higher causation
standard will not provide a deterrent to the type of mass-claimant
stockpiling seen in the Raymark and fen-phen debacles. In other
words, the threat of independent experts must be a consistent one
in order to negate the settlement leverage plaintiffs' attorneys gain
by screening thousands of potential claimants.
Consistent appointment of neutral experts also solves, to some
extent, the debate over when these experts must be appointed.
Because the mass-screening scenario involves the potential that
claimant numbers will be inflated merely to pressure defendants to
settle, the argument might be made that the neutral experts should
be appointed immediately to counter plaintiffs' leverage. If such
experts are consistently appointed in such cases, however, this
counter leverage will exist no matter when in the course of the
proceeding experts appear.
A consistent appointment approach, of course, begs the question
of how to determine which cases merit application of this rule. Not
all cases will automatically demand a court-appointed expert, and
there are certainly cases, beyond the scope of this Note, in which
163. Id. at 1394. Judge Jones deferred the effective date of his ruling in recognition that
Judge Pointer, presiding over the national MDL, had implemented a similar panel of experts
to assess the scientific validity of plaintiffs' causation claims. Though Judge Pointer appointed
his panel pursuant to Rule 706, the results were similarly in favor of the defendant. See David
E. Rovella, Panel Finds Silicone Risk Is Unproten, Breast Implant Plaintiffs Regroup, Await
NIH Report, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B1.
2070 [Vol. 48:2043
DERAILING THE GRAVY TRAIN
such experts are appropriate. This Note posits simply that court-
appointed experts should be appointed in cases alleging personal
injuries resulting from exposure to a product or substance for which
the defendant is responsible. In each case, counsel would be
permitted to argue against such an appointment, and judges would
remain the ultimate arbiters of this decision.
The use of court-appointed experts could either complement
state statutory reform by providing courts with neutral, case-
specific diagnostic protocols, or be used alone and serve a more
expansive role in combating mass-screening abuses. Judges who
have employed this judicial tool have been overwhelmingly and
unanimously satisfied with the results.' Neutral, court-appointed
experts appear to hold significant promise in curbing mass-screen-
ing abuses.
C. Sanctions
Both avenues of attack against fraudulent mass tort screening
discussed above-state tort reform and court-appointed experts-
are independently capable of drastically altering the cost/benefit
structure of mass screening, thereby rendering it an ineffective
method for plaintiffs' attorneys to make money. Because money
making appears to be the primary, if not the only, motivation for
such practices by plaintiffs' attorneys, 6 ' the implementation of
such changes will likely reduce or eliminate the incidence of mass
screenings. In spite of such promise, though, neither curative
method is without flaws. State legislative reform depends on the
political process for enactment; court-appointed experts depend on
the discretionary appointment of the court, and many judges have
voiced concern about the effect of the practice on the adversarial
system.'66 In short, a fallback, catch-all approach may be needed to
shore up the holes in the legislative and court-appointed-expert
approaches.
This catch-all approach should take the form of sanctions. As
discussed above, courts already have several avenues leading to
164. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 132, at 1009.
165. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
166. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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sanctions against misbehaving litigants." 7 The one used by Judge
Jack in the silica opinion, however, best fits the mass-screening
scenario. Finding that the plaintiffs' counsel, by ignoring the clear
indications of widespread unreliable diagnoses, had "unreasonably
and vexatiously" multiplied the proceedings, Judge Jack fined the
attorneys pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.168
Section 1927 states that "[any attorney ... who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, ex-
penses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct."'69 Courts have construed § 1927 to require "evidence of
recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive," but have noted that
imposition of such sanction is committed to the court's discretion. 170
Furthermore, as the plain language of the statute indicates, the
sanctions are limited to those costs resulting from the unreasonable
multiplication of the proceedings; this sets the outer limit for
sanctions to those costs incurred after the offending party exercised
bad faith.
This limitation is the reason Judge Jack sanctioned the silica
counsel only for costs associated with preparation for the Daubert
hearings rather than for all the defendants' costs. In fact, she stated
specifically that "[a]bsent strict construction, the Court likely would
find that liability [for sanctions] arose with the filing of the Com-
plaint."171 Judge Jack, however, also pointed out that it should have
been initially apparent to plaintiffs' counsel that the sheer number
of claims filed was enough to imply medical implausibility. 72 Given
that she concluded that the "clear motivation ... of the diagnostic
process was to ... overwhelm the Defendants and the judicial
system,'' Judge Jack surely had sufficient evidence of '%ad faith
or improper motive" to support sanctions.
This hesitation to impose meaningful, deterring sanctions has
been seen before in mass torts, and may in part account for the
167. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
168. In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 673-79.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) (emphasis added).
170. Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp., 38 F.3d 1414, 1416-17 (5th Cir. 1994).
171. In re Silica Prods., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 676 n.181.
172. Id. at 674.
173. Id. at 676.
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proliferation of these fiascoes. For instance, in the Raymark tire
workers cases, Judge Kelly openly acknowledged the "attorney
defendants' reckless disregard of the truth, [and] their knowing
intent to defraud."174 Yet, despite this acknowledgement, the Judge
refused to invalidate the settlement, pursuant to which Raymark
had paid tens of millions of dollars. 175 The end result, therefore, was
that the plaintiffs' attorneys who employed blatantly fraudulent
diagnostic techniques ended up netting millions in contingency fees.
With that kind of result, it is no surprise that silica-type diagnosing
disasters have been uncovered fifteen years later.
The solution to this problem is obvious: judges should use § 1927
to its fullest extent after a finding that counsel have "unreasonably
and vexatiously" multiplied the proceedings. Rather than finding
the latest possible point in the litigation at which to assign liability,
judges should examine the diagnostic processes themselves to
determine whether they imply bad faith. Further, other courts
should follow Judge Jack's lead by allowing discovery into the
screening practices employed by plaintiff firms.176 If this discovery
uncovers persuasive evidence, as it did in the silica cases, that the
diagnoses underlying plaintiffs' claims ought never to have been
trusted by plaintiffs' counsel, then those attorneys should be held
responsible for all costs. Such sanctions would provide much
stronger deterrence against future screening abuses than the
relatively slight ones administered in the silica litigation.
Finally, it is worth repeating that sanctions are not meant to be
the primary or first line of defense against improper mass screening.
Rather, sanctions should be used as a last line of defense; if state
legislative provisions or court appointed experts cannot cure the
abuse, then courts should turn to sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The preceding descriptions of the mass-screening abuses seen
in asbestos, fen-phen, and silica, combined with the near certainty
174. Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *14 (D. Kan. May
30, 1990).
175. See id. at **28-29 & n.1; see also Brickman, supra note 55, at 101-02.
176. See Parloff, supra note 1, at 104 ("Judge Jack ruled that if a screening doctor's
diagnosis was the basis for filing the suit, then information about it should be discoverable.").
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of future abuses, make it clear that some legal recourse is war-
ranted. This Note suggests a three-pronged approach. The three
approaches-legislative reform, court appointed experts, and
sanctions-may work together to eliminate screening abuses, or
they may work independently to achieve the same end. What is
important is that courts take seriously the problem posed by these
assembly-line diagnosis practices. These practices do not help truly
injured plaintiffs recover; rather they dilute those claims by
lumping them together with others, all of which will be disposed of
without an individual examination of their merits. The adversarial
system has failed for twenty years to solve this problem; implemen-
tation of the solutions this Note suggests will help reverse that
trend.
Matthew Mall*
* Thank you to Rebecca Womeldorf for handing me the tail-Judge Jack's opinion--of
this tigerish topic. Thank you also to Catherine Mall for listening to my various ravings
during this Note's composition.
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